Independent Fiscal Institutions as a Part of European Traditions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.46282/blr.2024.8.1.756Keywords:
Fiscal Councils, Independent Fiscal Institutions, Fiscal Policy, Fiscal DeficitAbstract
Fiscal councils are independent public institutions aiming to promote the sustainability of public finances through various functions, such as assessing budgetary plans and their implementation or preparing budgetary and macroeconomic forecasts. Thus, synthesising the attempts made in the literature to define the concept of independent fiscal institutions, it should be emphasised that by providing an independent, impartial and objective assessment of fiscal policy and performance, they promote sound fiscal decisions and sustainable public finances. Independent fiscal institutions also reduce information asymmetries and promote transparency in public finances, thereby raising the reputation and electoral costs for governments that pursue imprudent policies or breach key commitments. As such, they can support contemporary states in addressing the tendency to increase spending and deficits. To better understand the contemporary factual and normative state of the analysed dissertation topic, it is worth tracing, even in some summary, the process of emergence and the directions of development and evolution of independent fiscal institutions. Although independent fiscal institutions are relatively new bodies in the political architecture of the vast majority of the EU Member States, a small group of countries pioneered the creation of these institutions. It is necessary to trace the systemic solutions that have determined the legal and constitutional status of fiscal institutions in recent decades in order to understand the factors that have led to their reassessment.
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Narodowe Centrum Nauki
Grant numbers 2022/47/D/HS5/00859